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1. Introduction
A farmer-controlled business (FCB) is a corporate firm 
where a larger or smaller share of the stock is owned by 
farmers, either individually or through a farmers’ society 
that owns stock in the FCB (Chaddad and Cook, 2004; 
Hess et al., 2013; Hind, 1999). The remainder of the stock 
is owned by investors of different kinds. They may be 
local people in the firm’s operating region, municipalities, 
business partners, a farmers’ union, risk capitalists, or a 
stock exchange. The business operations of an FCB take 
place within the corporate firm, organized as a joint stock 
company or a limited liability company. However, the part-
ownership by farmers means that the firm operates at least 
to some extent in the interests of farmers and not only for 
profit maximization for non-farmer investors. The objective 
of an FCB is affected by the proportion of seats on the board 
of directors held by farmers’ representatives, the intensity 
of competition, and other factors.
The aim of the present study is to explore how farmers’ 
decisions to deliver to a FCB firm or to investor-owned firms 
(IOFs) are affected by their assessment of the attributes 
of these two types of firms. Such research is interesting 
because the amount of empirical research about farmer 
behaviour in relation to FCBs is scarce (Al-Hasan et al., 
2002; Hess et al., 2013). In addition, the number of FCBs 
is increasing, as many agricultural co-operatives are being 
converted into FCBs (Boland and Cook, 2013; Fulton and 
Hueth, 2009; Gunnarsson Myrelid, 1999; Lamprinakis and 
Fulton, 2011; Nilsson and Gunnarsson, 2000). FCBs are 
now commonplace in countries such as the UK, Ireland, 
Finland, and South Africa, but they also operate for example 
in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Many previous studies have examined farmers’ view of their 
co-operative and their loyalty, attitudes, knowledge, and 
related constructs (Barbaud-Didier et al., 2012; Bravo-Ureta 
and Lee, 1988; Burt and Wirth, 1990; Cain et al., 1989; 
Hind, 1997, 1999; James Jr. and Sykuta, 2006; Jensen, 1990; 
Lind and Åkesson, 2005). The findings from these studies 
are quite diverse but there is a common feature, namely that 
there are systematic differences between farmers supplying 
to co-operatives and farmers supplying to IOFs. Farmers 
tend to appreciate the social links within the membership 
body and the fact that the co-operative constitutes a reliable 
A farmer-controlled business from a farmer perspective
J. Nilsson1*, C. Liljenstolpe2, L.W. Lind3 and S. Liang4
1Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 7013, 750 07 Uppsala, Sweden; 2AB Stelacon, 
Sankt Eriksgatan 63, 112 34 Stockholm, Sweden; 3Ministry of Rural Affairs, Rural Growth Division, 103 33 Stockholm, Sweden; 
4Liaoning University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, International Education College, No.79, Chongshan East Road, Huanggu 
District, Shenyang, 100847, China P.R.; jerker.nilsson@slu.se
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Abstract
The ownership of food processing firms affects farmers supplying those firms with agricultural products. This study examined 
the effects of supplying either a farmer-controlled business (FCB) or competing investor-owned firms (IOFs). An FCB is 
owned and controlled partly by farmers and partly by external investors. Analysis of data obtained from a survey of pig 
producers in Sweden indicated that partial ownership by farmers resulted in them perceiving the FCB as having some co-
operative traits. The FCB suppliers were less inclined to exit, used their voice more, and showed greater loyalty than the IOF 
suppliers. In the long term, however, the farmers’ relatively positive view of FCBs might change because this organizational 
form contains inherent conflicts between the interests of the farmers and the external investors. As competition intensity 
increases and primary agriculture becomes increasingly concentrated, the co-operative features of an FCB are due to become 
vaguer over time. These problems may threaten the long-term existence of FCBs.
Keywords: farmer-controlled business, co-operative, investor-owned firm, agriculture, member
Copyright: © 2014 J. Nilsson et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
J. Nilsson, C. Liljenstolpe, L.W. Lind and S. Liang
202 Journal on Chain and Network Science 14 (2014)
trading partner (Bhuyan, 2007; Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; 
Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). However, it is important that 
they can trust their co-operatives and feel that they are being 
properly treated (Borgen, 2001; Hansen et al., 2002; Nilsson 
et al., 2009).
The empirical data analysed in this study were obtained 
from a survey of Swedish pig breeders delivering to either an 
FCB or various competing IOFs. The FCB was established by 
conversion of a former traditionally organized co-operative, 
whereby the ownership was split between two farmers’ 
societies and external investors, although with farmers 
occupying the majority of seats on the board of directors.
Owing to the farmers’ part-ownership and part-control of 
an FCB, farmers may exhibit some loyalty to the FCB. The 
farmers’ seats on the board of directors may ensure that 
the FCB offers better conditions for the farmers. Hence, 
there may be some factual co-operative traits that foster 
confidence among farmers.
The next section presents the theoretical basis of the study, 
leading to the formulation of three hypotheses. Thereafter, 
an account of the empirical study is given, including a 
presentation of the FCB and data collection, the choice of 
statistical techniques, and the results obtained. The final 
sections contain discussions and conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
Exit, voice, and loyalty in co-operatives
A basic characteristic of the co-operative business form is 
that a co-operative has three roles, namely patron, controller, 
and owner (Barton, 1989). The co-operative’s members are 
those individuals who deliver products to it, buy goods and 
services from it, borrow from it, work in it, do whatever 
they need to do, all depending on the type of co-operative 
concerned. The members are members because they reap 
benefits in their role as patrons to their co-operative. Co-
operatives are commonly assumed to exist because members 
would have experienced high transaction costs had they 
operated on open markets (Williamson, 1989, 2000). 
Vertical integration in the form of co-operatives may reduce 
farmers’ transaction costs (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; 
Hendrikse and Feng, 2013; Staatz, 1987).
For a co-operative to be of value to its members, it is 
necessary for the members themselves to control it. They 
must participate and be active in the general assembly, 
inform themselves about the business activities, elect 
a board and various committees, and be prepared to be 
nominated and be elected into governing bodies. Hence, 
the monitoring role is subordinate to the patron role.
In order to monitor a co-operative, its members must own 
it. The ownership is generally collective, i.e. the individual 
members own shares that are usually not tradable and 
appreciable. Upon exiting the co-operative society, the 
members sell their shares back to the co-operative at par 
value.
It can be deduced from this that FCBs are not co-operatives, 
as the patrons do not have full ownership and full control. 
Nevertheless, in countries where FCBs are common, these 
businesses may be considered to be a special kind of co-
operative.
The three roles played by co-operative members provide 
them with various possibilities to influence the business 
activities of the co-operative firm. Hirschman (1970) 
distinguishes between three major ways to affect an 
organization. The first way is exit, whereby actors may stop 
or reduce their exchanges with their current partnering firm, 
thus signalling dissatisfaction. In a co-operative context this 
can take place in all three roles. The members can reduce 
their patronage of the co-operative, or even stop the business 
relationship completely. Furthermore, members can reduce 
their activities in the member democracy system. Declining 
member participation at the general assembly, for example, 
is a worry for the leadership. Members may also exit the 
co-operative society completely, whereupon their shares 
are redeemed, with the result that the co-operative’s equity 
capital is reduced. When new members are recruited to the 
co-operative the opposite occurs, as they contribute business 
volume, monitoring resources, and equity capital.
In the second way, referred to by Hirschman (1970) as voice, 
the members of a co-operative society have influence, mainly 
in their role as controllers. Voice in a co-operative is most 
evident when it comes to the formal member democracy 
system, but may also be exerted in the patron role, although 
this is not typical of co-operatives. Customers and suppliers 
may convey suggestions, complaints, and opinions to 
managers within all trading partnerships, irrespective of 
business form. The members have few possibilities to make 
their voice heard in their role as owners as the shares are not 
freely tradable. It should be noted that all kinds of signals 
may express both positive and negative opinions.
Loyalty, Hirschman’s third category of reaction, does not 
involve the individual taking action to impose changes in 
the organization. However, members send signals to the 
co-operative leadership by being loyal, just as stakeholders 
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of an IOF provide signals by being loyal. The difference 
between the two organizational types is that co-operative 
loyalty is more far-reaching, as it involves signals in all three 
roles of membership, while the suppliers to an IOF send 
signals only in their role as trading partners. Co-operative 
loyalty has been noted historically because there must be 
at least some social capital within a membership. Members 
easily understand that disloyal behaviour is harmful to the 
co-operative and to fellow farmers.
The signal associated with trading partners’ exit from an 
IOF is restricted, as the IOF’s sales statistics do not reveal 
the reasons for changing volumes. The situation is different 
in co-operatives, where voice supplements the information 
given by a decision to exit. The combination of exit and voice 
is likely to promote member loyalty to a co-operative. Hence 
this combination has been claimed to be a competitive 
strength of the co-operative business form (Ollila, 1989). 
On the other hand, there are costs associated with running 
a member democracy system (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 
2013; Pozzobon et al., 2012).
The farmers’ use of exit or voice depends on the economic 
implications of each alternative. Hence, voice is presumably 
more likely than exit when farmers have made large 
irreversible investments in their farming operations. 
Their transaction-specific investments mean that they 
are locked into the co-operative (Helper, 1991). Another 
factor is whether the co-operative has much unallocated 
equity, i.e. capital that will not be redeemed to the 
members individually (Holmström, 1999). Due to these 
circumstances, exit is less attractive for members, so they 
are more inclined to express dissatisfaction through voice.
The paragraphs above indicate members’ possibilities of 
signalling their opinions to their co-operative, compared 
with the influence that trading partners may have in IOFs. 
It is therefore interesting to compare farmers’ behaviour to a 
co-operative and to a firm that is neither a co-operative nor 
an IOF, but an intermediary business form such as an FCB.
Hypotheses
Exit
Suppliers to an IOF can easily terminate their deliveries 
or reduce or increase them, although this is conditional 
on the existence of alternative attractive buyers and the 
terms of any supply contract signed in the past. There are 
no obstacles in terms of ownership relations, transaction-
specific investments, or possibility to obtain advantages 
from the partner’s equity.
There may be some barriers associated with exiting from a 
co-operative. The members may experience aversion from 
remaining farmer-members. The co-operative’s bylaws may 
stipulate a long period until the exiting is completed and 
the shares are redeemed. Again, the ease of exiting depends 
on the existence of competing buyers and the terms of any 
existing contract. If there is no other attractive business 
partner, the barrier to leave a co-operative may be high for 
farmers with large transaction-specific investments.
Discontinuing deliveries to an FCB is easier for its suppliers, 
provided that there are other buyers for their agricultural 
products. They can retain their membership in the share-
owning farmers’ society. Any farmer exiting an FCB can 
expect some, but limited, social sanctions from other 
farmers. Since the FCB has farmer-directors, the farmers 
may have some trust in the FCB, although less than in a co-
operative. This suggests that farmers have a lower propensity 
to stop delivering to the FCB than to an IOF in the event 
of dissatisfaction. The considerations above led to the 
empirical testing of this hypothesis:
H1:  FCB suppliers rank lower as concerns propensity to exit than 
IOF suppliers.
Voice
When patronizing an IOF, the farmers have no formal voice 
option. They have the possibility to communicate with the 
staff at various organizational levels in a partnering IOF, and 
the staff may listen to some of the suggestions, complaints, 
and advice. However, when dissatisfied with an IOF the 
farmers have no formal possibility to influence any strategic 
decisions within the IOF. Without such a possibility the IOF 
suppliers are likely to resort to exiting if they are dissatisfied, 
or continue delivering despite their dissatisfaction.
The situation is different in a co-operative, as the farmers 
are not only patrons, but also controllers and owners. The 
members have the formal right to raise their voice, at least 
when it comes to electing directors. Members are able to 
induce strategic changes in the co-operative, as they have 
communication channels to the directors or other elected 
representatives.
The attributes that are typical of co-operatives are weaker in 
an FCB, although they do not disappear altogether. Given 
that an FCB is partly owned and controlled by a farmers’ 
society, the farmers have the possibility of exerting their 
influence through voice. However, this is limited by the 
fact that the external co-owners have a rightful demand for 
capital returns. These demands are in fact legally binding, 
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as a majority owner is not permitted to discriminate against 
a minority owner. Hence, farmers have a possibility to exert 
their voice in an FCB, but only to a limited extent. The 
resulting hypothesis is:
H2:  FCB suppliers rank higher in terms of voice than IOF 
suppliers.
Loyalty
Given that an FCB is operating under market conditions, 
co-operative principles like fair pricing and equal treatment 
cannot be expected. Members’ information about what is 
happening in the market-place is limited, although the 
farmers have an information channel through the share-
owning society. Members’ loyalty to an FCB is not self-
evident, as that would not only involve loyalty to fellow 
farmers in the owning farmer society, but also loyalty to 
the external owners. Even though external investors own 
only a part of an FCB, such firms must obey the laws of the 
market and act in the same fashion as IOFs.
Nevertheless, the fact that the board of an FCB is dominated 
by farmer representatives will mean that the FCB has a better 
reputation among farmers than the competing IOFs. The 
farmer directors are elected by the supplying farmers and, 
in order to be re-elected, they must ensure that the FCB has 
at least somewhat better policies towards the suppliers than 
IOFs provide. This is necessary to raise the degree of farmers’ 
loyalty to the FCB. Hence, a third hypothesis is:
H3:  FCB suppliers rank higher in terms of loyalty than IOF 
suppliers.
In summary, it is hypothesized that FCBs adopt an 
intermediate position between co-operatives and IOFs as 
regards all three ways in which suppliers can mediate their 
dissatisfaction or satisfaction with partnering firms.
3. Empirical approach
Empirical basis
In 2007, the market-dominating traditional slaughterhouse 
co-operative in Sweden sold its entire operating business to 
a Finnish FCB. This is one of Northern Europe’s largest food 
processors within the meat industry, with operations in most 
countries around the Baltic Sea. It has 10,000 employees 
and a turnover of 2,125 million euros (2009).
When the Swedish co-operative sold its operations to the 
Finnish FCB, the payment was a number of shares in this 
FCB, which meant that the Swedish co-operative society 
continued to exist, but its only assets were shares in the FCB.
Most of the Finnish slaughter firm’s equity capital is listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, but the board of directors 
is controlled by a Finnish farmer society. The explanation 
behind this ownership and control structure is that there are 
two categories of shares. One category has 20 votes per share 
and these shares are mainly owned by the Finnish farmers’ 
society (Pyykkönen and Ollila, 2012). The other category of 
share, owned by the Stock Exchange, has one vote per share. 
Most of the stocks that the Swedish farmers’ society received 
as payment are those with weak voting power. Hence, the 
Finnish farmers’ society continues to dominate the board 
of directors. Table 1 shows the FCBs structure of ownership 
and control.
When the Swedish co-operative was sold, it had all the 
attributes of a traditional co-operative such as mainly 
collective ownership, equal voting rights for the members, 
and a principle of equal treatment of members. The co-
operative was a market leader, with 60-80% market share 
depending on the animal species. It was the result of an 
almost nationwide merger in 1999 that resulted in a large, 
heterogeneous membership and a complex, diversified 
Table 1. Ownership and control of the food processing farmer-controlled business studied (www.hkscan.com/en/hkscan1; 
www.sverigesdjurbonder.se).
Attribute Owner category
Swedish farmers’ society Finnish farmers’ society Others Total
No. of farmer-members 15,300 1,600 n.a. n.a.
Directors (+ deputy directors) 1 (+1) 3 (+1) 2 6 (+2)
Share of the votes 12.5% 69.3% 18.2% 100
Share of the stock 12.8% 34.9% 52% 100
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business structure. It had far-reaching vertical integration, 
from breeding to consumption-ready products. However, 
its financial results were poor due to the difficulties of 
integrating the operations of the merging co-operatives 
(Lind, 2011).
When the data were collected, the FCB slaughterhouse was 
paying the same price for the farmers’ animals as its IOF 
competitors. However, when the former co-operative was 
acquired by the Finnish FCB, the IOFs were paying a higher 
price. This resulted in less volume for the co-operative which 
then led to costly over-capacity in all its business operations.
Sample and respondents
Data were collected during March 2009, i.e. two years 
after the co-operative’s operations had been sold to the 
FCB. A postal survey was conducted among pig farmers, 
both suppliers to the FCB and those selling to IOFs, in 
Scania, the southernmost province of Sweden1. This 
province was selected as it has intensive agricultural 
production, with pig producers accounting for approx. 
30% of total pig production in Sweden. Scania also has 
many slaughterhouses. For example, the country’s largest 
slaughterhouse facility, which is owned by the FCB, and 
five IOF slaughterhouses operate within the province or 
nearby. Hence, the slaughterhouses compete intensely for 
the farmers’ pigs, and the farmers have many options to 
choose between.
A data-set comprising all Scanian farmers who were 
registered as pig producers was acquired from Statistics 
Sweden. A postal survey was conducted among the entire 
population of 664 farmers. When the deadline had expired 
only 118 pig producers had returned filled-in questionnaires. 
A reminder was sent to the farmers who had not answered, 
whereby another 57 pig producers replied. Hence, the 
number of usable questionnaires was 175.
It emerged, however, that the data set provided by Statistics 
Sweden contained inaccuracies. While in total 165 farmers 
responded in the first data collection round only 118 
(71.5%) were actually pig producers and 47 farmers 
(28.5%) declared that they had stopped as pig producers. 
The proportion between active pig producers and former 
producers among respondents in the second data collection 
round was similar (57 and 23, respectively).
1 The data-set used in the present study is the same as that used by 
Hess et al. (2013).
Hence the actual population was smaller than the 
one reported by Statistics Sweden. Due to the current 
concentration trend in the pig industry it is unlikely that 
any new pig farming operation has started. It is probable 
that the correct population size was about 71.5% of the 664 
reported by Statistics Sweden, i.e. 475 farmers. In that case, 
the response rate was about 36.8%.
Variables and questions
The dependent variable was whether the farmers deliver 
their pigs to the FCB or to one or more of the five IOF 
slaughterhouses, which are located where pigs can easily 
be delivered to them. The question was phrased as 
follows: ‘Which slaughterhouse or slaughterhouses do 
you deliver to, and how large is the percentage of animals 
you deliver to each slaughterhouse?’ The respondents were 
asked to indicate a percentage for each of the six named 
slaughterhouses or their sales on the spot market. The 
percentages had to add up to 100.
The farmers’ decisions may be explained by their views on 
their relationships with their different business partners. The 
literature about farmers’ choices between co-operative and 
IOF trading partners contains a large number of explanatory 
variables such as social links, trust, reliability, and treatment 
(see Section 1). On the basis of which variables could 
provide explanatory power, nine variables were chosen as 
independent variables.
Each of the nine variables was transformed into questions 
which were included in a questionnaire. The variables were 
arranged into the three modes of expressing dissatisfaction 
or satisfaction suggested by Hirschman (1970).
Exit
•	 Dedicated assets as perceived by the farmers. ‘What kind 
of pig production do you have?’ The respondents were 
asked to choose between Slaughter pigs, Piglets, or 
Integrated production, totally or partly. The production 
form that requires the largest amount of dedicated assets 
is integrated production, i.e. the piglets that are born on 
a farm are raised and fattened on the same farm.
•	 Economic dependence as perceived by the farmers. ‘What 
percentage of your working hours do you spend on the 
farm?’ The respondents were asked to state a percentage 
of their time spent on farming activities and the same 
for pig production.
•	 Preference for co-operatives: ‘Assume that [the Swedish 
farmers’ society] and [the Finnish farmer’s society] 
withdraw as owners of [the FCB] or that any of the other 
slaughterhouses acquire pig farmers as owners – would 
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you then change your preference?’ The respondents were 
asked to indicate their opinion on a scale of 1-3 where 1 
= Probably, 2 = Perhaps, and 3 = Probably not.
•	 Distance to the slaughterhouse. ‘How far is it to the 
slaughterhouse(s) to which you deliver your pigs?’ 
The respondents were asked to write the number of 
kilometers to their most frequently used slaughterhouse 
and their second most frequently used slaughterhouse.
Voice
•	 Suggestion frequency by the partnering firm as perceived 
by the farmers. ‘How many times during the previous 
year have you complained about anything or suggested 
something to the slaughterhouse(s) to which you deliver 
your pigs?’ The respondents were asked to state the 
number of complaints and suggestions to the FCB and 
to other slaughterhouses.
•	 Suggestion treatment by the partnering firm, as perceived 
by the farmer. ‘Which slaughterhouse will consider your 
suggestions, questions, and complaints the most?’ The 
respondents had three options, namely the FCB, Another 
slaughterhouse, and It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.
Loyalty
•	 Trust as perceived by the farmers. ‘Which slaughterhouse 
do you trust the most?’ The respondents had three 
options: the FCB, Another slaughterhouse, and It doesn’t 
matter/I have no opinion.
•	 Provision of information from the buying firm as perceived 
by the farmers. ‘Do you receive market and financial 
information (regarding supply and demand of pigs and 
pork) from the slaughterhouse(s) to which you deliver 
today?’ The respondents were asked to answer either Yes 
or No.
•	 Reliability of information as perceived by the farmers. 
‘This slaughterhouse provides the most reliable market 
information.’ The respondents had three options: the 
FCB, Another slaughterhouse, and It doesn’t matter/I 
have no opinion.
Calculations
Due to the complexity of producers’ choice of a buyer, it 
could be argued that the relationship between this choice 
and explanatory variables exhibits a non-linear form 
through a function f(z). The logit model has proved to be 
convenient for establishing a logistic relationship when the 
dependent variable is binary, in this case the choice between 
two buyer categories.
A farmer’s choice of the FCB was denoted ‘1’ and the choice 
of an IOF or both an IOF and the FCB was denoted ‘0’. 
Following Ben Akiva and Lerman (1993) among others, a 
typical logit model formulation was derived. The derived 
choice probability of choosing the FCB, P(FCB), was defined 
as an exponential function of z, where z is a linear function 
of n explanatory variables:
                              exp(z)
P(FCB) = f(z) =                 
                           exp(z) + 1
where z = α + β1x1 + … + βnxn
Estimation of the logit model was performed using the 
econometric software program Gretl by Cottrell and 
Lucchetti2. In order to determine the variables explaining 
the choice probability of delivering channel, we initially had 
the full set of explanatory variables of interest obtained from 
the survey. From there, we conducted backward elimination 
of insignificant parameters (with accepted significance 
level P<0.1). In addition, we applied robust standard error 
according to Huber-White.
4. Results
The results from estimation of the logit model are presented 
in Table 2. In order to facilitate interpretation of the 
estimated coefficient of the logit model, the marginal effects 
on probability of the explanatory variables are presented.
According to the logit model regression, several variables 
explain the probability for the pig producers’ choice of 
slaughterhouse.
Exit
•	 Dedicated assets: The FCB suppliers were more engaged in 
investment-heavy integrated production or production 
of fattening pigs. Farmers who specialized in piglet 
production were more often suppliers to an IOF.
•	 Economic dependence: FCB suppliers tended to be more 
dependent upon the buying slaughterhouse, as more 
of them were full-time farmers than the IOF suppliers.
•	 Preference for co-op: The farmers’ preference expressed 
their psychological bonds with a trading partner. This 
variable reflected the producers’ propensity to switch 
between the FCB and IOF slaughterhouses. The FCB 
suppliers were less prepared to change between trading 
partners, while IOF suppliers were more prone to do so.
•	 Distance: A short distance between the farmer and the 
FCB slaughterhouse raised the probability of delivering 
to the FCB. Increasing distance (higher transportation 
costs) meant that the producer tended to deliver to an 
IOF or a combination of an IOF and the FCB rather than 
2 http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/pub//gretl/manual/en/gretl-guide.pdf.
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to the FCB only. The FCB suppliers’ preference for their 
trading partner may be considered to be dependent on 
their view that this firm has geographical proximity.
Voice
•	 Suggestion frequency: If producers had once or twice found 
it worthwhile to direct complaints to an IOF or to the 
FCB, they were considered to have used voice. One or 
more complaints meant that the dummy variable ‘Voice’ 
was equal to unity for this respondent. The farmers’ use 
of ‘voice’ increased their propensity to deliver to the FCB. 
The FCB suppliers were more closely linked to the FCB 
and so they were more inclined to use voice rather than 
exit.
•	 Suggestion handling: The FCB suppliers considered that 
the FCB is more receptive to suggestions, questions, and 
complaints than the IOF slaughterhouses.
Loyalty
•	 Trust: The FCB suppliers claimed to a larger extent than 
the IOF suppliers that their outlet is more trustworthy.
•	 Provision of information: This variable expressed the 
slaughterhouse’s provision of market and financial 
information to pig producers. The perceived information 
contributed positively to the probability of delivering 
to the FCB.
•	 Reliability of information: The FCB suppliers considered 
the information from the FCB to be more reliable. Due 
to the size of the marginal effect, this variable had a 
relatively high influence on the probability of delivering 
to the FCB.
5. Discussion
Farmers’ view of farmer-controlled businesses
All nine indicators used point in the expected direction. 
The findings indicate that farmers consider the FCB to have 
some co-operative traits. As the comparisons in the present 
study are between FCBs and IOFs, and not between FCBs 
and co-operatives, it is not possible to determine to what 
extent the FCB is considered to be a variant of co-operatives 
by the farmers.
The present study concerns one single case, which is not 
representative of FCBs at large. Furthermore, there is no 
other empirical research concerning farmers’ views of FCBs 
in comparison with either IOFs or co-operatives, so it is not 
possible to compare the findings of the present study with 
those of previous studies.
One point of comparison is a previous study of farmers’ 
motives for choosing between almost the same set of 
Table 2. Logit model estimation concerning pig farmers’ choice of slaughterhouse, with the choice of the farmer-controlled 
business as the dependent variable.
Variable Coefficient Std. error z Marginal effect Significance
C -1.29 0.611 -2.11 **
Exit
Dedicated assets -1.21 0.436 -2.78 -0.263 ***
Economic dependence 0.727 0.419 1.73 0.164 *
Preference for co-op -1.19 0.547 -2.18 -0.259 **
Distance -0.00696 0.00308 -2.26 -0.00164 **
Voice
Suggestion frequency 0.834 0.501 1.67 0.195 *
Suggestion treatment 1.64 0.571 2.87 0.388 ***
Loyalty
Trust 1.33 0.674 1.98 0.321 **
Provision of information 1.25 0.453 2.75 0.270 ***
Reliability of information 1.79 0.901 1.99 0.410 **
R2 0.242
LogL 86.911
*Significant at P<0.1 **significant at P<0.05 ***significant at P<0.01.
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slaughterhouses that are included in the present study 
(Lind and Åkesson, 2005). The data for the previous study 
were obtained through personal interviews with a sample of 
farmers in Scania. At that time the traditional co-operative 
had not yet been taken over by the Finnish FCB. The study 
compared the motivational factors behind pig farmers’ 
choice between the co-operative and IOF slaughterhouses 
and found that the co-operative suppliers were more 
oriented towards co-operative ideology and social concerns 
than the suppliers to the FCB. Hence after the co-operative’s 
operations were sold to the FCB the farmers have become 
less co-operatively oriented.
The fact that the farmers have a poorer view of the FCB 
compared to their view of the same firm, when it was a 
pure cooperative, indicates that there may be problems 
with the FCB business form. It is possible that intensified 
competition induces the FCB to adapt more IOF-like 
attributes as concerns pricing policies, services to farmers, 
and contractual conditions. If so the farmers’ view of the 
FCB would be further impaired. As FCBs may change in 
character over time, they may be seen as a transitional form 
and not only as a hybrid organizational form. If the farmers’ 
position declines sufficiently, they may be transformed into 
IOFs, fully owned by external financiers (Fulton and Hueth, 
2009; Fulton and Larson, 2009).
The development of farmer-controlled businesses
FCBs are often established when co-operatives try to adapt 
to intensified competition through far-reaching vertical 
and horizontal integration. The vertical expansion requires 
investments of such magnitude that the farmer-members 
cannot afford to finance them. The complex business 
operations as a consequence of vertical operations require 
highly professional management. Hence, the members 
will have difficulties retaining full control, whereby agency 
problems and property rights problems may increase (Cook, 
1995; Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). The horizontal expansion 
is likely to create distances between members and between 
members and the leadership. Because of weakened social 
ties member involvement shrinks (Nilsson et al., 2009, 2012; 
Österberg and Nilsson 2009).
This development is illustrated by Pyykkönen and Ollila 
(2012) when they describe the process of hybridization in 
the FCB that is under study in this article. In the late 1980s 
the co-operative established a subsidiary, which split the 
ownership between the co-operative society and individual 
members. As the need for capital and professionalization 
increased, institutional investors were invited to be 
shareholders in the mid-1990s, whereby the shares were 
publicly listed.
Interviews with stakeholders in this FCB were reported by 
Pyykkönen and Ollila (2012). The respondents expressed 
some worries. The membership becomes increasingly 
heterogeneous due to structural changes in agriculture, 
leading to conflicts between member categories. The large 
farmers in particular have reason to be dissatisfied because 
upon exit the farmers are redeemed the par value of their 
co-operative shares. The corresponding share value at the 
Stock Exchange is several times higher so the co-operative 
society kept the difference.
It is difficult for an FCB to maintain a balance of interest 
because:
[a] supplier may appreciate the highest possible 
producer price and the investor is expecting high 
dividends and the increase in market value of the 
company. … There are no objective guide-lines for 
determining how much to pay to suppliers as higher 
price, compared to the interest paid to the investors 
(Pyykkönen and Ollila, 2012: 25).
As farmers become fewer in number, the remaining ones 
are not able to supply the FCB with sufficient capital. If
… in 2020 there are only 800 members in [the 
co-operative] and the largest 100 producers own 
around half of the cooperative’s equity. … The largest 
suppliers may require a larger role when making 
important decisions. … They might demand the 
division of the [co-operative’s] shares in [the FCB] 
to members. This would in fact mean the abolition 
of entire [co-operative] as such. Another alternative 
would be that … [the] cooperative was changed to a 
limited liability company and the cooperative shares 
were changed into company shares (Pyykkönen and 
Ollila, 2012: 25).
The investors may lose their confidence in the FCB being 
controlled by farmers so they hesitate to invest more capital 
in the FCB. Hence the balance of power might tip in favour 
of the Stock Exchange. If so, the farmers’ loyalty to FCBs is 
bound to diminish.
… (I)n the future the joining of the two series of 
[shares] must be considered. The strong role of 
the cooperatives that exceeds the owner share may 
decrease the attractiveness of the company from 
institutional investors’ perspective. … However, 
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that difference in voting rights has probably been 
discounted in the market value of the shares. … 
Therefore, in order to keep the investors happy the 
company has to pay good dividends (Pyykkönen and 
Ollila, 2012: 23).
De Bont and Poppe (2012) present case studies of three 
Belgian and Dutch FCBs. These three differ from the FCB 
focused on in this study to the extent that the external 
investor is not a Stock Exchange but Belgian and Dutch 
farmer unions, whereby the FCBs seem to be less vulnerable.
In each of the cases the ‘mother organization’ has 
been able to take major decisions in investing capital, 
direct or indirect financed by their members. This 
is only possible in a situation where the ‘mother 
organization’ enjoys the confidence of the members 
(De Bont and Poppe, 2012: 35).
Nevertheless, there is a latent conflict between the members 
of the farmer unions and the suppliers to the FCBs. De 
Bont and Poppe (2012) do not address issues of future 
contingencies, for example what might happen to the FCBs 
if the animal breeders become an even smaller fraction 
of the farmers’ unions’ membership or how the farmers’ 
unions’ members react if the FCBs show poor financial 
results.
One rationale behind FCBs is that these firms have 
secured resources from the two main types of suppliers, 
i.e. capital from the investors and commodities from the 
farmers (Pellervo, 2000). Thereby the two parties become 
mutually dependent and conflicts may be solved easier 
through internal bargaining rather than through the market 
mechanism. This may be an advantage when the firm has 
sizeable transaction-specific investments. Nevertheless the 
two parties have divergent interests and the balance of power 
may shift. The locus of power within a value chain is with 
the organization, which supplies the chain’s other links 
with the most important type of resource (Fulton, 1995). 
For example, the external owners may find that slaughter 
animals from the owning group of farmers are too expensive 
so they would prefer animals from other sources. Such 
opinions have, according to Swedish mass media, been 
expressed by the management of the FCB, focused on in 
the present study. While the FCB may get a safe supply of 
cheap inputs from other sources than the members of the 
cooperative, it is more difficult for the cooperative to raise 
capital from other sources than the existing external owners.
This reasoning implies that sooner or later the processing 
firm is likely to be converted from an FCB into an IOF. The 
conflict of interests will threaten the survival of FCBs. ‘…in 
determining whether the costs of ownership are manageable 
for a given class of patrons, homogeneity of interest appears 
to be an especially important consideration’ (Hansmann, 
1996: 288). Such a conversion may, however, be deferred 
because of ‘some path-dependency inertia in the ownership 
structure’ (Mygind, 2009: 165).
6. Conclusions
This study investigates how farmers behave in relation to 
a FCB and to competing IOFs. An FCB is partly owned 
by farmers and partly by external investors, and its board 
normally has a majority of farmer representatives. Empirical 
data were obtained through a postal survey of Swedish 
pig producers delivering either to an FCB (previously a 
traditionally organized co-operative) or to some of the five 
IOF slaughterhouses in the region. The findings indicate 
that the FCB has some co-operative traits in the eyes of 
the farmers. All three hypotheses tested were supported by 
the data:
H1:  FCB suppliers rank lower as concerns propensity to exit than 
IOF suppliers.
As the FCB farmers had larger irreversible financial 
investments they had a stronger reason to have a secure 
marketing channel for their products. Since they were more 
likely to be full-time farmers, they were more dependent 
upon the FCB in personal economic terms. The observation 
that the FCB suppliers express an appreciation for short 
geographical distances between their farms and the 
slaughtering plant’s location may be an indicator of less 
propensity to leave the FCB.
H2:  FCB suppliers rank higher in terms of voice than IOF 
suppliers.
The FCB suppliers’ propensity to use voice may be a result of 
trust in the FCB. Trust in an organization is a consequence 
of being listened to, and being listened to results in trust.
H3:  FCB suppliers rank higher in terms of loyalty than IOF 
suppliers.
Loyalty is often found in co-operative memberships as 
members try to avoid the uncertainty of doing business 
with IOFs. As an FCB is partly owned and controlled by the 
farmers, such an organization is likely to act in ways that 
strengthen farmers’ loyalty.
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The farmers regard the FCB as an intermediate business form 
between a co-operative and an IOF. It should, however, be 
recognized that an FCB can only to a limited extent support 
farmers as the leadership is obliged to consider the interests 
of the non-farmer owners. Thus it cannot afford to uphold 
traditional co-operative principles such as equal treatment 
of members and open pricing. An FCB is to a large extent 
obliged to operate in the same way as IOFs. In spite of 
all this, the members of the owning co-operative may still 
consider an FCB to have some co-operative characteristics.
There are a few possible explanations for the fact that the 
FCB suppliers considered this firm to have some co-operative 
traits. One is that the interval between conversion and data 
collection was short (two years), so the former members 
had perhaps not fully recognized that their co-operative 
had turned into another business form. In addition, the 
FCB’s decision-makers at intermediate organizational levels 
are mainly the same people, working in the same manner 
as before.
However, it may also be the case that an FCB is actually a 
good trading partner for many farmers depending on the 
circumstances. Due to the farmer ownership and board seats 
an FCB is likely to provide better conditions for the farmers 
than an IOF. An FCB has to operate efficiently because this 
is demanded by the investors.
An FCB may also be a better trading partner for the farmers 
than a co-operative as the collective ownership and control 
within co-operatives may create agency problems. It may 
be that the members do not want to invest as much as is 
needed for preserving competitiveness or members may try 
to free-ride or the portfolio of assets is not optimal due to 
the lack of signals from the capital market. The resulting 
inefficiencies are the reason why many co-operatives have 
been transformed into other organizational forms in recent 
decades.
FCBs may be regarded as hybrids between IOFs and co-
operatives, having inherited some co-operative features, such 
as a certain loyalty and trust that farmers often have toward 
their co-operatives. Likewise it has attributes from IOFs, 
which serve to enhance efficiency and market adaptation. 
On the other hand the two owner categories may also have 
given FCBs some attributes that are less positive for farmers. 
The traditional co-operative principles of equal treatment, 
fair pricing, equal voting rights, etc. must be relinquished. 
The farmers are usually unable to raise enough capital to 
invest in the FCB. The need for top-performing management 
in the FCB means that member control becomes difficult.
Hence the tensions between the two ownership categories 
of FCBs may become overwhelming in time. The built-
in conflicts of interests might even mean that FCBs are 
converted into IOFs.
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